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The Historical and Ideological Context of Donald Trump
by Jeff Taylor
Front Porch Republic Annual Meeting
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana
October 8, 2016

How do we explain the Donald Trump phenomenon? When he announced his candidacy
for president, no one believed that he had a realistic chance to enter the White House. He was
viewed as a joke candidate running an ego-driven campaign to promote his brand and his reality
television show. He stunned everyone by defeating 16 opponents for the Republican presidential
nomination—most of whom were respected professional politicians. He did this despite
increasing opposition and hysteria from the GOP establishment, DC-based conservative pundits,
neoconservatives, the Bush family, Fox News, the mainstream media, Wall Street, and the
Democratic Party. He became the first non-politician to be selected as a presidential nominee of
a major party since General Eisenhower in 1952.
Many people—locally, nationally, and internationally—are mystified, shocked, and
fearful of what Trump represents. How could this have happened? Trump is a singular person
but his nomination as a non-politician is not unprecedented and he embodies some important
political values. He can be placed in historical and ideological context.
Trump’s Appeal
Before getting to the context, however, we should spend a few minutes on Trump’s
appeal. Initially, his candidacy was almost-universally seen as a self-promoting stunt. He
reportedly had to hire a crowd of actors to cheer for him when he came down the escalator at
Trump Tower in New York City to announce. He is not qualified to be president. He is
obviously crude and crass. If he is a Christian, his faith is childlike.
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So what accounts for Trump’s success in the primaries—a close second-place finish in
the Iowa caucuses, a smashing victory in the New Hampshire primary, and then important wins
in contested states like South Carolina, Nevada, Georgia, Alabama, Virginia, Michigan, Florida,
Illinois, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Indiana? His national appeal was broad enough to chalk up
victories in both Massachusetts and Mississippi, New York and North Carolina. By the time the
primary season ended, Trump had set a new record for the number of raw votes received by a
Republican: over 13 million. It was an astounding feat for someone who had never run for
elective office before, who was a complete political amateur.
Trump accomplished this despite media ridicule and hostility, including an order from
Rupert Murdoch to Roger Ailes of Fox News to take down Trump by having the moderators
hammer him in the Fox debate of August 6, 2015 (“This has gone on long enough,” Murdoch
told Ailes.) Yes, the television networks often covered his well-attended rallies live but they did
this early on not because the TV executives and reporters were trying to help him into the White
House but because he was good for the corporate bottom line. He attracted ratings and ratings
translate into profits. This self-interested national public platform eventually gave way to open
opposition by almost every mainstream media outlet.
Such media vitriol had not been seen since Barry Goldwater ran for president in 1964.
Trump was routinely described as racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, misogynistic, obnoxious,
stupid, violent, and insane. He was compared to Hitler. Guilt-by-association charges linked him
to the Ku Klux Klan, the Mafia, Vladimir Putin, and Saddam Hussein. Supposedly objective
news wire companies such as the Associated Press disseminated almost nothing except snarky,
inaccurate, and out-of-context stories on a daily basis. They did this with a straight face, as “fact
checkers” worked overtime pretending to debunk almost everything Trump was saying. Of
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course, the corporate press did not explain the threat that a Trump presidency would pose to
themselves and the power elite status quo of which they were a part.
Populism and nationalism are not only upsetting on a personal level to those who wield
power and profits under the status quo; they are also a threat to their jobs and income. Trillions
of dollars are stake in such sacrosanct, bipartisan pillars of established statecraft such as Wall
Street, the Federal Reserve, open borders for cheap labor, managed trade pacts like NAFTA and
TPP, the Pax Americana global empire, NATO, perpetual war in the Middle East, and the federal
government’s special relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia. One nutty celebrity
businessman too rich to be controlled cannot be allowed to stand in the way of such important
and beneficial things. So all stops have been pulled out. To the point where Donald Trump—
who has been well known for decades to Americans—has been demonized.
Obviously, Trump’s egomaniacal persona and choleric temperament have been offputting to many voters. While the media have capitalized on every misstep in a way they have
never done with members of the Bush and Clinton families—whom they generally like and with
whom they can do business—the media have not caused these missteps. Most are self-inflicted.
They reflect both Trump’s inexperience in electoral politics and penchant for emotional, honest
outbursts. In many ways, he is ill-suited for high public office in the 21st century. He has clear
deficiencies in temperament and experience. (Although, it must be added, many people
appreciate his unfiltered speaking, unambiguous masculinity, relatable earthiness, business
success, and celebrity status.) He has poor character in the eyes of both religious moralists and
political-correctness acolytes. If temperament, experience, and character are a mixed bag at best,
it means that Trump’s strongest suit is policy.
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What is the main reason so many voters—not only Republicans but also Independents
and Democrats—have flocked to Donald Trump? By January 2016, he was seen as the only
genuine anti-establishment figure in the Republican primaries who had a chance of winning the
nomination. Rand Paul ran a poor campaign and blew his opportunity. Ben Carson was likeable
but an underwhelming speaker. Ted Cruz said the right things to each audience he addressed but
his televangelistic, unctuous speaking style raised doubts about his sincerity. Jeb Bush and
Marco Rubio represented the latest incarnations of the failed Bush-McCain-Romney status quo.
Even the hyperventilating opposition of institutions like George Will, David Brooks, Charles
Krauthammer, Bill Kristol, National Review, and the DC-based Religious Right was not
persuasive. Instinctively, if not intellectually, Trump supporters viewed the conservative NeverTrump crowd as hucksters who have made billions over the decades from sincere grassroots
Republicans while delivering nothing in terms of good public policy from their offices in
suburban Virginia. It all seen as a self-serving charade. A crooked game designed to turn out
votes for pragmatists like Dick Cheney, John Boehner, and Mitch McConnell, who have never
genuinely cared about conservative principles (economic, social, or constitutional). Trump was
burning the whole dishonest GOP power structure to the ground. For millions of cynical and
disengaged voters, this has been exhilarating. The many failures of the George W. Bush years
were never acknowledged, let alone apologized for, by the Republican Party in 2008 and 2012.
In one sense, Trump is the “Payment Due” notice for this inability to be honest and conservative.
Many Trump supporters probably worry about whether he will follow through on his
promises and conduct himself in a way that will not bring discredit upon himself and our country
if he becomes president. At the same time, he represents the first real opportunity in decades to
change the direction of the country. Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton have both promised more of
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the same. Most Americans, being populist and nationalist, do not like a corporate-dominated
political system, economic globalism, and unnecessary wars and foreign meddling. Sincere or
not—and evidence suggests that he is sincere—Trump promises a change.
Historical Context
Although Donald J. Trump is extraordinary as a presidential nominee in 2016, there are
historical antecedents. They fall into three categories: personality (choleric), background
(business), and ideology (populism). By personality, I mean a choleric temperament
characterized by being practical, strong, productive, willful, bossy, combative, and irritable
(among other things). By background, I mean a business leader—specifically an entrepreneur
who became wealthy by building a large company. By ideology, I mean an embrace of
populism, which supports the rights, aspirations, and power of the people (i.e., democracy).
Analogous examples in history of presidential contenders with a choleric personality
include President Andrew Jackson, Senator Hiram Johnson, President Harry Truman, and Texas
billionaire Ross Perot. Jackson was viewed by many of his more-respectable contemporaries as
unqualified for the White House given his fiery temper and violent past. Johnson, the California
governor who was Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose running mate in 1912 and went on to
become a giant of the U.S. Senate and two-time GOP presidential candidate, was strong and
stubborn. Sam Francis once called Truman “perhaps about as close an imitation of Il Duce
[Mussolini] as this country has ever produced.” Perot had a charming side to him as an
independent candidate but was also known to be prickly and argumentative.
Candidates with a business background who could be thought of as forerunners of Trump
include newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst, automobile pioneer Henry Ford, mining
engineer Herbert Hoover, utilities executive Wendell Willkie, Texas wheeler-dealer John
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Connally, and pizza executive Herman Cain. Hearst was a leading contender for the Democratic
nomination in 1904 but his wealth and private life offended many Democrats who shared his
populist views, including William Jennings Bryan. Ford twice tested the presidential waters and
twice won the Michigan primary—on the Republican side in 1916 and the Democratic side in
1924. Hoover, who had become a multimillionaire by the age of 40 with investments throughout
the world, was touted for president in 1920 within the Democratic and Republican parties (and
served as secretary of Commerce prior to becoming president). Unlike Hearst and Hoover, the
next three forerunners did not build a great business empire of their own. Willkie, who had been
a Democrat before capturing the Republican nomination in 1940, moved from being a corporate
attorney to president of a New York-based utility company. Connally had been an LBJ protégé,
corporate lawyer, federal department secretary, and Democratic governor of Texas before
running a business-friendly campaign for the 1980 Republican nomination. Cain, a Pillsbury and
Burger King executive before becoming CEO of Godfather’s Pizza, moved into politics after
retiring from business and made an attempt at the 2012 Republican nomination.
In addition to candidates with a business background, we can consider the broader
category of contenders who were not professional politicians before seeking the presidency.
Some had non-business backgrounds. By the mid-1800s, nominating conventions were choosing
one national standard bearer to represent each major political party. If we set aside potential
nominees and concentrate on actual nominees, there were 12 such men chosen by their parties to
compete in the general election between 1848 and 2008:
1848 - Gen. Zachary Taylor (W)
1852 - Gen. Winfield Scott (W)
1856 - Maj. (and pioneer) John C. Frémont (R)
1864 - Gen. George McClellan (D)
1868 - Gen. Ulysses Grant (R)
1872 - editor Horace Greeley (D)
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1880 - Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock (D)
1904 - Judge Alton Parker (D)
1908 - Judge/Sec. William Howard Taft (R)
1928 – businessman/Sec. Herbert Hoover (R)
1940 - businessman Wendell Willkie (R)
1952 - Gen. Dwight Eisenhower (R)
Of these 12, two served in Congress for less than a year prior to seeking the presidency—
Frémont was briefly a member of the U.S. Senate (D-CA) and Greeley was briefly a member of
the U.S. House (W-NY)—but neither was known primarily as a politician. Seven of the 12 were
military officers. Six of those seven were generals (the one exception, Frémont, later became a
general during the Civil War). The tradition of choosing a non-politician as a presidential
nominee was most popular in the mid-to-late 1800s. There were seven of these nominees during
a 32-year period. It was a more rare circumstance in the twentieth century, with all such
examples taking place before 1960. Over the years, there have been a few presidential nominees
with relatively little and minor experience in elective office before being nominated—notably
William Jennings Bryan (1896) and John W. Davis (1924). Both served only in the U.S. House
(Bryan for four years; Davis for two).
Not surprisingly, populism is popular with the people who elect candidates to public
office. This being the case, and politicians often wanting to tell voters what they want to hear,
most candidates pose as populists of some sort—economic or cultural—whether they are actual
populists or not. An insincere “populist,” who intends to use the people as a steppping stone to
personal power, is more accurately labeled a demagogue. There is also a populism-of-style that
sometimes has little correlation with populism as an ideology. Examples of candidates who have
had a folksy, down-to-earth personality but have filled their administrations with plutocratic
appointees and policies include Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton, and George W.
Bush.
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Given the importance on public policy of a candidate’s ideology, I am seeking to identify
genuine populists as Trump antecedents. It is a judgment call since honesty and motivation are
often difficult to discern with confidence. But politicians have a track record when it comes to
executive actions, voting records, campaign contributions, and institutional affiliations. I use
these to identify political populists since the nineteenth century. Examples of Trump-like
candidates who have favored popular sovereignty over elite rule include President Andrew
Jackson, three-time nominee William Jennings Bryan, William Randolph Hearst, Henry Ford,
Hiram Johnson, Senator Huey Long, Senator Robert Taft, Senator Barry Goldwater, Senator
George McGovern, Governor George Wallace, Governor Ronald Reagan, Governor Jerry
Brown, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rev. Pat Robertson, commentator Pat Buchanan, Ross Perot,
attorney Ralph Nader, Congressman Ron Paul, Congressman Dennis Kucinich, Senator Mike
Gravel, and Senator Bernie Sanders.
Despite his wealth, Pres. Jackson was loved by many of the common people and his
name is attached by historians to the growing democratization of the country. He is also famous
for having successfully killed the aristocratic Second Bank of the United States. Nationalism—
as opposed to internationalism, globalism, and imperialism—is often linked to populism. An
“America First” type of patriotism is popular with average Americans. Not as a banner under
which to conquer other countries and intervene in their internal affairs but rather as a means of
loving our own country and defending it. In modern political discourse, Gen. Jackson’s name is
also attached to a type of nationalism that includes military might but not in an imperialistic,
supposedly “do-gooder” way in far-away places (e.g., going “abroad in search of monsters to
destroy,” to quote Jackson’s opponent John Quincy Adams).
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As someone in the Jefferson-Jackson tradition, with an added infusion of evangelical
Christianity, Bryan was leader of the populist wing of the Democratic Party from 1896 to 1912.
More pacifist than Jackson, Bryan opposed the proposed League to Enforce Peace in 1916-17
because he thought it would pull the nation into unnecessary wars (“America first!…Beware of
Entangling Alliances,” he wrote). Later, he supported the League of Nations but unsuccessfully
pressed for sovereignty-protecting reservations (amendments).
Hearst was a populist and nationalist. He supported Bryan for president in 1896 and
1900. In 1904, his own platform was radically left-wing by respectable standards of the day.
During his unsuccessful campaigns for president, mayor of New York City, and governor of
New York state, Hearst was backed by many urban workers. He was an “isolationist” in foreign
policy in the sense of wanting to follow the traditional Washington-Jefferson advice of steering
clear of foreign political/military alliances. Hearst opposed U.S. involvement in World War I,
the League of Nations, the World Court, and World War II. Although viewed as more
conservative in his later years, he continued to support populist/nationalist candidates in both
parties during the 1920s.
Like Hearst, Ford built a fortune that allowed him to have independence from Wall
Street. Ford thought of himself as a friend to the common man, distrusted New York banks, and
attempted to keep the U.S. out of World War I. His anti-Semitism, however, repelled many
Democrats in the early 1920s, including W.J. Bryan.
Johnson was a populist progressive within the GOP as governor and senator of California
from the 1910s through the 1940s. He voted against the League of Nations. His 1920 campaign
for the presidential nomination used the slogan “America First.” As ranking Republican on the

9

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he resisted U.S. entry into World War II and was planning
to vote against the United Nations charter in 1945 (dying, he was too sick to vote).
As governor and senator of Louisiana, Long fought New York-based monopolies,
including Standard Oil. Despite his autocratic style and questionable ethics, he was apparently a
sincere populist. Viewed with alarm by the plutocratic press as a radical leftist, he was planning
to challenge FDR for the 1936 Democratic nomination when he was cut down by an assassin.
He had publicly stated that his choice for secretary of War would be Gen. Smedley Butler,
highly-decorated veteran and author of the anti-war book War is a Racket.
Taft was a populist opponent of Wall Street despite his own background of privilege as
son of a president. His foreign policy was one of America First nationalism. He opposed U.S.
entry into World War II, was skeptical of the Marshall Plan, opposed creation of NATO, and
criticized the imperialism and militarism of the Cold War despite being anti-communist.
Goldwater was more hawkish than Taft but he was a nationalist supporter of the Cold
War, not an internationalist in the bipartisan Truman-Rockefeller tradition. He was a strong
advocate of free-enterprise capitalism but his 1964 candidacy was supported by national-focused
businessmen, not by the larger transnational corporations. Like Taft, Goldwater was feared and
detested by Wall Street Republicans. He represented Middle America while RockefellerRomney-Scranton (R) and Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson (D) were the electoral favorites of corporate
America. Goldwater was arguably the last anti-establishment presidential nominee of the
Republican Party until Trump over 50 years later.
Wallace is tainted (understandably so) by the racism associated with his defense of
segregation in Alabama in the early 1960s. His evolution as a national figure during his four
consecutive presidential campaigns, from 1964 to 1976, increasingly moved his emphasis from
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racism to populism. This was not simply a cynical attempt to expand his base. He was in the
tradition of Jefferson-Jackson-Bryan southern populists who were both race-baiters and genuine
populists (e.g., Benjamin Tillman, James Vardaman, Theodore Bilbo). While he was one of the
three top contenders for the 1972 Democratic nomination, he was shot by a would-be assassin.
Unlike Long, Wallace lived. Gov. Wallace failed in the 1976 primaries but opened the door for a
party-transcendent populist coalition led by Gov. Reagan.
In 1972, McGovern became the first anti-establishment presidential nominee of the
Democratic Party since Bryan in 1908. His campaign slogan “Come Home, America,” reflected
his opposition to the Vietnam War and imperial overseas entanglements in general. The radical
implications of populism and nationalism were sometimes compromised by McGovern’s
tendency to be a bleeding-heart, big-government liberal Democrat. Still, his abandonment in the
general election by the party’s power brokers and traditional funders were a sign that his politics
were unacceptable to Wall Street and the military-industrial complex.
As a former Hollywood actor, Reagan was not a professional politician of many years.
As California governor, however, he did lead the nation’s largest state for eight years and he
made three attempts at the White House before entering it. These things set him apart from
Trump. He was also an ideological hero for the conservative movement. He represented the
populist wing of the Republican Party by 1976, when he challenged the Ford-Rockefeller
administration in the primaries. He was opposed by Wall Street and the establishment wing of
the GOP. Locally, wealthy country-club Republicans sided with Ford against Reagan, just as
most had done with Rockefeller against Goldwater (1964) and with Eisenhower against Taft
(1952). In foreign policy, Reagan was in the Goldwater mold of well-armed nationalism against
détente-minded internationalism. The mainstream media mocked and castigated Reagan as
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stupid, extreme, and dangerous. Some of that criticism carried over to his successful 1980
campaign, but when he chose George H.W. Bush as his running mate, he apparently made his
peace with the establishment. Generally speaking, the Reagan presidency was filled with NixonFord-Bush Republicans in the top positions and its policies were more corporate-friendly than
populist.
John Connally was not a populist but he did have a nationalist message in 1980 and when
he lost the South Carolina primary to Governor Reagan, he supported the Californian over the
more-global-minded George H.W. Bush in the Texas primary.
Brown—the once and present California governor (young and very old)—ran for
president in three different decades. His first bid, in 1976, was tentative and late. His second, in
1980, was interesting in its appeal but fell flat when faced with stronger opponents (Pres. Carter
and Sen. Kennedy). His third, in 1992, was the most successful of all. He tapped into the antiestablishment sentiment of that year, along with Buchanan and Perot, and his overt populism and
peace-minded nationalism had a transcendent appeal across partisan and ideological lines.
Brown condemned the Persian Gulf War and urged rejection of NAFTA. He garnered millions
of votes in the primaries and continued to challenge Gov. Clinton at the convention. He refused
to support the nominee in the fall. He briefly left the Democratic Party during the Clinton years,
in the mid-1990s, denouncing it as a tool of Wall Street and other corporate interests. After
becoming mayor of Oakland, state attorney general, and governor once again, Brown is now just
another conventional liberal Democrat.
Rev. Jackson, like Trump, was not a politician when he first sought the presidency. He
was a minister, but, more importantly, he was a civil rights leader. In 1984, he ran as the first
African American to mount a serious bid for the Democratic nomination. He received 3.5
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million votes and carried several states. Four years later, he doubled his popular support as he
ran a populist campaign that pulled in a substantial number of white voters to supplement his
black base of support. He won a half-dozen southern states and even some northern states,
including Michigan and Alaska. Jackson’s 1988 primary vote was nearly a third of the electorate
and he was the runner-up at the convention. It was an amazing accomplishment for a nonpolitician. In 1993, Jackson was part of what the Wall Street Journal disparagingly called “the
Halloween Coalition” of populists who united, despite party and ideology differences, to try to
stop NAFTA (other members: Brown, Buchanan, Perot, and Nader . . . and, less publicized at the
time, Trump).
Nader, a renowned consumer advocate and progressive activist, was a candidate for
president in four consecutive elections—twice with the Green Party and twice as an independent.
Possessing an ideology of transcendent populism, Nader has tried to unite the grassroots Left and
grassroots Right against the plutocratic Center. As a candidate, he had limited success in
reaching beyond his base of true-believer liberals. Many Democrats began to hate him because
they (wrongly) blamed him for causing the loss of Gore in 2000 (a year in which Nader garnered
3 million votes). He is also not considered trendy by 21st-century progressives because he
eschews identity politics and obsession with sexual-centered cultural issues in favor of a unified
coalition of the common people. Ironically, the populist Nader came out with a book, in 2009,
called Only the Super-Rich Can Save Us! Written in utopian fiction style, the book did not
include Trump among the hoped-for helpful billionaires.
Kucinich, Gravel, and Sanders each waged unsuccessful campaigns for the Democratic
nomination during the 2004-2016 period. The first two were not nearly as popular as Jackson or
Brown at their peaks (1988 and 1992, respectively). Sanders, on the other hand, exceeded their
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success even though he, too, fell short by the end of the primary season. All three denounced
plutocratic politics. Kucinich added a New Age spirituality vibe, including vegetarianism.
Gravel emphasized direct democracy. Just as Brown had done with Bill Clinton, Sanders
criticized Hillary Clinton for her cozy relationship to Wall Street. Kucinich and Gravel were not
nationalists but they were internationalists à la John Lennon (not Henry Kissinger/Madeleine
Albright/neoconservatives). Sanders was more tentative in his foreign policy pronouncements
but he was an opponent of the Iraq War (unlike the Clintons). Strange as it seems to
conventional wisdom, there is cross-over support for both Sanders and Trump (for backers of
each who do not prioritize social issues). Populism is the explanation.
Robertson, Buchanan, Perot, and Paul each represent a populist/nationalist movement
within conservatism and the Republican Party that culminated in the nomination of Trump in
2016. For this reason, they will be dealt with in greater detail.
Ideological Context
Despite his unusual business and television background, crude personality, and
instinctive (rather than intellectual) politics, Donald Trump is in a stream of
populism/nationalism that was exemplified on the national stage by presidential candidates Pat
Robertson, Pat Buchanan, Ross Perot, and Ron Paul during the 1988-2012 period.

Varieties of Conservatism
SOC = Social (pro-Christianity, pro-traditional-marriage, anti-abortion, anti-sexual-hedonism)
POP = Populist (pro-democracy, anti-elitist, anti-Wall Street)
INST = Institutional (pro-Constitution, pro-limited-gov’t, pro-fiscal-restraint, anti-deficit,
anti-progressive-pragmatism)
NAT = Nationalist (pro-Am-First, pro-fair-trade, anti-globalization, anti-world-policeman,
anti-UN/NATO/NWO)
LIB = Libertarian (pro-freedom, pro-individualism, pro-natural-rights, anti-statism)
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The five types of conservatism can be matched to decentralism and its four philosophical
underpinnings (“the quadratic persuasion” of my book Politics on a Human Scale). The
quadratic persuasion’s attendant ideologies can also be linked. Historically speaking—and going
further back in time before Andrew Jackson—this milieu is associated with Thomas Jefferson
and his political allies.
Social = Morality = Traditional Conservatism
Populist = Democracy = Populism
Institutional = Decentralism = Traditional Conservatism
Nationalist = Decentralism & Community = Traditional Conservatism & Communitarianism
Libertarian = Liberty = Libertarianism
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